D avid Fitzgerald's book, which began as his doctoral dissertation at University College Cork in Ireland, attempts to do two things, and succeeds in both. On one hand, the book provides a concise and useful survey of U.S. Army counterinsurgency (COIN) and stability operations from Vietnam through the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. On the other hand, it is first and foremost a story of the Army's complicated relationship, through its doctrine, with the concept and practice of counterinsurgency itself. More critically for the book's overall thesis, Fitzgerald assesses that the Army's failure in Vietnam led it to turn away from the war's lessons as it sought to rebuild a shattered force. The post-Vietnam army did this through its doctrinal revival of the mid-seventies and eighties. Led by Training and Doctrine Command, the Army focused its training, education, doctrine, and weapons acquisition programs on the Warsaw Pact threat in Europe, not coincidentally the threat that best aligned with the firepower-intensive, mechanized American way of war. But even as the Army developed the doctrine of Active Defense, followed in the 1980s by Air-Land Battle, certain portions of the force, most notably special operations, continued to fight small wars and engage in "operations other than war" in Central America and in the Balkans without a concurrent intellectual basis in doctrine and education. The post-Vietnam decades saw a continued atrophy of the Army's doctrinal and educational knowledge of stability operations and COIN, to the point that when U.S. forces encountered a growing insurgency in Iraq in the aftermath of the 2003 ground campaign, they approached the threat with a critical misunderstanding of its true nature. In this portion of the book, Fitzgerald constructs a devastating critique of U.S. strategy in Iraq, while highlighting tactical innovations, such as the use of Commander's Emergency Response Program funds, that eventually redeemed some of what was generally considered an irretrievable situation. To the book's larger point, though, these innovations proceeded from individual junior leader initiative and intelligence, not from a "learning institution" that was trained and prepared for COIN.
Learning to Forget is a cautionary tale of the dangers of retreating into an institutional "comfort zone" in a postwar or interwar period. In many respects, we are observing disquieting aspects of the same process now, with the end of combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and a refocus in professional military education (PME) and the combat training centers on "decisive action" competencies. There is reason for hope that the Army will not make the same mistakes this time around, because the inclusion of "hybrid threat" scenarios demands that leaders understand the simultaneous and fluid interplay of conventional operations and COIN. The advent of Doctrine 2015 also provides us a unique opportunity to institutionalize the tremendous operational and tactical knowledge of COIN that we have gained over the last ten years. This book is an excellent resource for doctrine developers and PME faculty and staff, and will be of interest to all professional soldiers.
